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Personal Property-Estates for Years-Nature of Interest
of Lessee of Estate for Years
In a recent North Carolina case 1 the plaintiff contended the defendant's written lease for five years, renewable for an additional term of
five years, was void for want of a seal. Held: An estate for years is
personal property, 2 and therefore a lease is not required to be under
seal. 3
The authorities are in conflict as to whether a lease is a contract,4 a
conveyance, 5 or a conveyance with contractual obligations superimposed. 6
This note does not discuss the nature of the instrument creating an estate
for years. The treatment is focused on the question of whether an
estate for years is real or personal property.
At early common law, an estate for years, although an interest in
land,7 was termed personal property because the ousted lessee could only
bring a personal action 9 inwhich he might be compelled to accept damages in lieu of specific restitution of the land. However, as early as the
fifteenth century, upon a judgment to recover the term by a writ
ejectione firmae, the sheriff executed the writ of possession by delivering possession to the lessee. 10 This procedure was so effective that freeholders abandoned the hallowed but highly technical real actions and
employed the fictions of John Doe and Richard Roe in order to avail
themselves of the action of ejectment. 1 Nevertheless, the estate for
years has continued through the centuries to be classified as personal
12
property, except as modified by statute.
' Moche v. Leno, 227 N. C. 159, 41 S. E. 2d 369 (1947).
2
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §8 (1936).
Interest in lands less than freehold,
such as estates for years, are grouped under the generic name of personal property.
These interests .are merely defined and not treated by the RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY.

'Mayberry v. Johnson, 15 N. J. L. 116 (1835); accord, Stephens v. Midyette,
161 N. C. 323, 77 S. E, 243 (1913).
But see Patterson v. Galliher, 122 N. C.
511, 513, 29 S. E. 773 (1898) (".. . a seal has been absolutely indispensable to
the validity of deeds in which is conveyed a greater estate than a three year
lease.").
'See Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272, 275 (1858) (Pearson, J.:. "A lease for
years is a contract, by-which one agrees for valuable consideration, called rent, to
let another have occupation and profits of the land for a definite time.") ; 2 BL.
Comm. *140 ("An estate for years is a contract for the possession of lands or
tenements, for some determinate period.").
'2 BL. Comm. *317 ("A lease is properly a conveyance of any lands or tenements, usually in consideration of rent or other annual recompense....").
"THOMPSON
TENANT

" BL.
'See
tion has
lease, of

ON REAL PROPERTY §1100

(1940); 1

TIFFANY,

LANDLORD AND

§16 (1910) ; 35 C. J. 1139; 32 Am. Ju. §2.
CoMMi. *317.
Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557, 565, 4 S. W. 56, 59 (1887) ("No proposibeen better settled from. the earliest days of common law than that a
whatever duration, is but a chattel.").

'I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

§3 (3d ed. 1939).

" 3 BL. Comm. *200.
"1 Ibid.
"See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 185, 221 N. W. 111,
112 (1928) ; Waddell v. United Cigar Stores of America, 195 N. C. 434, 438, 142
S. E. 585, 588 (1928) ; State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 159 Ore. 601, 630,
81 P. 2d 116, 128 (1938).
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,An estate for years is a chattel real.
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Its want of the quality of inde-

terminate duration precludes its being real property and constitutes it a
chattel. Its quality of immobility causes it to be denominated real.13
Such a hybrid chameleon may be expected to change its color with the
purposes against which it is scrutinized. Most commonly, leaseholds go
to the administrator as assets rather than descend to the heirs.14 On
the other hand, estates for years have been treated as real property and
governed by the law thereof for the purposes of conveyancing, 1 5 registration and recording,'8 Statute of Frauds,'1 taxation,' 8 sale upon execution,1 9 venue,2 0 eminent domain, 2 1 mortgages, 22 and prohibiting corporations ot acquire and hold real estate.23

The courts' difficulties arise from construing or interpreting the term
"real property" to determine if it embraces estates for years.

No diffi-

culty is encountered where a particular statute, such as a Statute of
Frauds, or a recording act, governs the purpose and spells out whether

or not it embraces leases or chattels real.

However, utmost vigilance

1 2 Br. Comm. *386.
,Fowler v. Laughlin, 183 Md. 48, 36 A. 2d 671 (1944) ; Orchard v. WrightDalton-Bell,Anchor Store Co., 225 Mo. 414, 125 S. W. 486, 20 Ann. Cas. 1072
(1910). 2 BL. Comm. *143 ("... an estate for a thousand years is only a chattel,
and reckoned as part of the personal estate."). Contra: Broadwell v. Banks, 134
Fed. 470 (C. C. D. Mo. 1905) (Ohio statute of descents controlled); McKee v.
Howe, 17 Colo. 538. 31 Pac. 115 (1892).
"' People ex rel. Healy v. Shedd, 241 Ill. 155, 89 N. E. 332 (1909); Robertson
v. Scott, 141 Tex. 374, 172 S. W. 2d 478 (1943). Contra: De Kyne v. Lewis,
4 N. J. Misc. Rep. 948, 139 AtI. 434 (1927) (Assignment of 99 year lease by wife
was not a conveyance of real property requiring a seal and assent of the husband.);
Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917) (Cardozo,
J., distinguished between a conveyance of real property and a conveyance of interests in
real property.).
"8 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 111 -(1928).
Statutes usually control; see WASH. REv. STAT. (1931) §10550. Contra: Hollenbeck v. McDonald, 112 Mass. 247 (1873) (999 year lease of spring with easement
to enter and repair aqueduct held valid against bona fide purchaser without notice.
Overruled by a subsequent statute.); State Trust Co. v. Casino Co., 46 N. Y.
Supp. 492 (1897) (Mortgage on lease invalid against creditors because it was
not refiled annually as the statute required for chattel mortgages.).
" Palochucola Club v. Withington, 159 S. C. 446, 157 S. E. 621 (1931). Contra:
Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P. 2d 962, 103 A. L. R. 822 (1935) (oral
agreement for brokers' commissions) ; Myers v. Arthur, 135 Wash. 587, 238 Pac.
899 (1925).
"sMoulton v. Long, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N. E. 297 (1922) (profit from the
assignment of a 5 year lease not income from sale of intangible personal property) ;
Chicago v. University of Ghicago, 302 Ill. 455, 134 N. E. 723, 23 A. L. R. 244
(1922). Contra: Eidman v. Baldwin, 206 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 2d 1913) (An estate
for years is personalty for purposes of inheritance tax.); Greene Line Terminal
Co. v. Martin, 122 W. Va. 483, 10 S. E. 2d 901 (1940).
" Hyatt v. Vincennes Bank, 113 U. S. 408 (1884) (Indiana statute setting up
procedure for sale of real property upon execution expressly embraced chattels
real.).
"0Gibson v. Logino, 111 Fla. 533, 149 So. 592 (1933).
" Mason v. City of Nashville, 155 Tenn. 256, 291 S. W. 1074 (1927); see
Leopard v. Autocar Sales and Service Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N. E. 2d 477 (1945).
"' Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne Co., 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 111 (1928).
"People ex rel. Healy v. Shedd, 241 Ill. 155, 89 N. E. 332 (1909) ; State Savings and Loan Association v. Bryant, 159 Ore. 601, 81 P. 2d 116 (1938).
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must be exercised to determine if some specific statute exists which governs estates for years for the purpose in question.
Some courts give a broad construction or interpretation corresponding to the layman's conception that real estate includes leases.24 Others
give a strict construction or interpretation and adhere to the technical
definition 25 where possible, for any related statutes are in derogation of
common law. The strictness of a court's construction or interpretation
for a particular purpose varies with the general statutory definition of
"real property" found in the construction statute, even though the court
may not have: mentioned the construction statute.
A construction statute is generally one of two types. The Missouri
statute28 is an example of the type which calls for strict construction or
interpretation. It defines "real property" to be "coextensive with lands,
tenements and hereditaments." 2 7 At common law, "lands, tenements
and hereditaments" embraced only estates of freehold.2 8 In Orchard v.
Wright-Dalton-Bell Anchor Store Co., the testator had devised his
"real estate," but the administrator c. t. a. took over and sold a twentyyear lease of the testator as personal property. Three related statutes
expressly prescribed that for the particular purposes of conveyancing,
dower, and sales upon execution certain leaseholds were to be treated
as real estate. The Missouri court painstakingly showed that the particular statutes neither applied to the circumstances involved nor generally converted common law personal property into real estate. The
sale was held valid.
In the other type of statute, such as found in Colorado, the general
definition of "real property" includes "lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein."2 0 Estates for years
24
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne Co., 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 111 (1928);
State Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 159 Ore. 601, 81 P. 2d 116 (1938).
"See Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, 159, 64 Am. Dec. 538, 543
(1855) ("The legislature was dealing with terms of art and is presumed to have
used them in their technical sense.") ; Foster v. Perry, 77 N. C. 160 (1877)
(".

. it is reasonable to give such a term [real estate] the meaning which it

.

ordinarily bears among professional men speaking on legal subjects. . . . The
words 'real estate' in this clause of the Constitution mean freehold estate.").
" Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1942) §655.
" Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. (1942)

§655; ARRK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §13261;

IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933) §2-4701(8); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §1: 1-2;
N.

Y.

GENERAL CoNsTRucTIoN

LAW §40; see also N.

Y.

PROPERTY LAW

§33

(". . . estates for years are chattels real.") ; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §12-3(6) ;
cf. Ky. R v. STAT. (Cullen, 1942) §446.010(13) (Land or real estate "includes
lands, tenements, and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein,
other than chattel interests.").
" See The Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, 159, 64 Am. Dec. 538,
543 (1855).
Z

225 Mo. 414, 125 S. W. 486, 20 Ann. Cas. 1072 (1910).

"CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 159, §2(5) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1944) c. 4, §7,
Moulton v. Long, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N. E. 297 (1922) (the terms of the statute
are broad enough to comprehend leaseholds); MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson,
1936) §2.212; TENN. ANN. CODE (Williams, 1934) §15, Kelley v. Shulz, 59 Tenn.
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have always been considered interests or estates in land.3 1 Therefore,
in McKee v. Howe,3 2 the Colorado court relied on the above statute
wherein real property is defined to include all interests in land, and held
that an estate for years was real property which descended to the heirs
at law.
North Carolina's construction statute33 is similar to that of Missouri.
It defines "real property" to be "coextensive with lands, tenements and
hereditaments." As a corollary, "personal property" is defined to include
"moneys, goods, chattels, choses in action and evidences of debt, including all things capable of ownership, not descendible to the heirs at law."
Thus the test for personal property is whether it is descendible to the
heirs at law. By implication the North Carolina court has held that
leaseholds of the decedent come into the hands of the administrator as
assets rather than descend to the heirs. 34 In a dictum Pearson, J.,
said: "A term for years is a chattel real, constitutes a part of the personal estate, passes by succession to the executor or administrator, and
is assets for the payment of debts." 3 5 Leaseholds have been treated as
7
36
personal property for purposes of levy and execution, registration,
and jurisdiction. 8 In one peculiar situation, the court construed "real
estate" in a statute to mean leaseholds.3 9
Where specific statutes for various purposes, such as the Statute of
Frauds,40 registration, 41 etc., require estates for years to be treated in
218 (1873) (the Code changed the character of a leasehold, making itrealty). But cf.
Ky. REv. STAT. (Cullen. 1942) §446.010(13) (land or real estate "includes lands,
tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein, other than
chattel interests").
312 BL. Comm. *317. Moulton v. Long, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N. E. 297 (1922)
(alternative holding); Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272 (1858); Mason v. City of
Nashville, 155 Tenn. 256, 291 S.W. 1074 (1927) (lease to upper story of building
vested interest in real estate). RESTATEMENT, PaonEnrT §9 (1936). See Dabney
v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P. 2d 962, 103 A. L. R. 822 (1935) ; Fifth Ave. Bldg.
Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917).
" 17 Colo. 538, 31 Pac. 115 (1892).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §12-3.
" Reeves v. McMillan, 101 N. C. 479, 7 S. E. 906 (1888) ; Lee v. Lee, 74 N. C.
70 (1876).
" Glenn v. Peters, 44 N. C. 457 (1853); see also Pate v. Oliver, 104 N. C. 458,
463, 10 S. E. 709, 711 (1889) ; Foster v. Perry, 77 N. C. 160, 162 (1877).
"' Glenn v. Peters, 44 N. C. 457 (1853) (overruled by N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
§1-315;
see also McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 841).
"T Burnett v. Thompson, 35 N. C. 379 (1852) (Held that a lease of 113 years
did not have to be registered. Pearson, J., recommended legislative action) ; Wall
v. Hinson, 23 N. C. 276 (1840). Cf. Holdebrand Machinery Co. v. Post, 204 N. C.
744, 169 S. E. 629 (1933). Contra: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §43-48 (all leases
for more than 3 years shall be recorded).
"Shuford v. Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank, 207 N. C. 428, 177 S.E. 408
(1934) (Court of justice of peace has exclusive original jurisdiction in action of
summary ejectment.).
" Lee v. Lee, 74 N. C. 70 (1876) (Statute authorized administrator to collect
the rents of "real estate." It was held that "real estate" mean "leaseholds" of the
decedent, for real property in general would not come into the administrator's
bands.).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §22-2.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §43-38.
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a similar manner with freehold estates, the legislature has generally
explicitly specified that certain leases are covered by that statute. 42 This
practice avoids the confusion resulting where the legislature redefines
"real property" for various purposes.4 3
That an estate vests in the lessee after actual entry is not questioned. 44 However, some doubt remains as to the nature of the lessee's
interest prior to actual entry. Although Justice Pearson held45 that the
Statute of Uses obviated the doctrine of interessi termin, 46 subsequent
courts have discussed the doctrine of interessi termini without mentioning the effect of the Statute of Uses.47 Thus the doctrine of interessi
48
termini may still exist in North Carolina.
An estate for years was classified as personal property at common
law; North Carolina's construction statute encourages strict construction
of specific statutes subjecting estates for years to the law of real property; specific. statutes have been well-drafted and clearly state if leases
are to be governed by them; the doctrine of interessi termini may still be
hanging over the court; all these factors support the court's conclusion
in the principal case that estates for years are personal property.
HENRY

E.

COLTON.

Real Property-Spite Fences
B built a "spite fence" 1 on his own property, within one and one-half
inches of the windows of the house of A, adjoining landowner, effectively
cutting off light and air therefrom, whereupon A secured an injunction
ordering removal, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on appeal,
reversed. The court held that malicious motive did not render a lawful
2
use of property unlawful, that motive in such use was immaterial.
The authorities are agreed that where the motive in erection of the
"'Example: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §22-2 (". . . and all other leases . . .
exceeding in duration three'years from the making thereof... ."). But cf. N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-76.
"'Example: WASH. REV. STAT. (1931) §2303 (As used in criminal code "real
property" includes every estate, interest and right in lands, tenements and
hereditaments.").
"Williams v. Randolph & C. Ry., 182 N. C. 267, 108 S. E. 915 (1921) (assignment distinguished from lease in that a lease creates an estate in land) ; Moring
v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272 (1858); 2 BL. Comm. *144.
'Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272, 275 (1858).
462 BL. Comm. *339.
"See Bunch v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 134 N. C. 116, 118, 46 S. E. 24, 25
(1903) ; State v. Boyce, 109 N. C. 739, 748, 14 S. E. 98, 100 (1891) (concurring
opinion); Barneycastle v. Walker, 92 N..C. 198 (1885).
"'1 MoaREcAfs LAW LcTuREs 531 (Dean Mordecai said: "I will back up
Judge Pearson against the field.").
'For definitions of the term "spite fence," see Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala.
381, 385, 58 So. 283, 285, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 129, 131 (1912) ; Burris v. Creech,
220 N. C. 302, 304, 17 S. E. 2d 123, 124 (1941) ; 39 WoRDs AND PHRASES (perm.
ed.) 816.
'Cohen v. Perrino, 50 A. 2d 348 (Pa. 1947).

